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Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system - Frandsen - 2019 - The RAND Journal of Economics - Wiley Online Library
PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda
Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda for joint service delivery - Voorn - 2019 - Public Administration - Wiley Online Library
Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda for joint service delivery - Voorn - 2019 - Public Administration - Wiley Online Library
CURRICULUM VITAE David MARTIMORT SHORT BIOGRAPHY David Martimort holds a position as a Directeur d'´Etudes at Ecole des Haute
Industrial Organization III: Contract Theory (EC855
A general solution method for moral hazard problems - Ke - 2018 - Theoretical Economics - Wiley Online Library
Agency Theory
Eco212B: Information Economics 1 Value of Information
PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda
The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle
Steal Something from Work Day | CrimethInc. Ex-Workers' Collective
Copyright infringement - Wikipedia
Transaction Costs and Incentive Theory - Persée
The Historical Origins of 'Open Science': An Essay on Patronage, Reputation and Common Agency Contracting in the Scienti
Congress's Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies - EveryCRSReport.com
PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda
Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretative Review
Principal-Agent Models | SpringerLink
Mechanism design - Wikipedia
CURRICULUM VITAE. David MARTIMORT - PDF Free Download
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching
PDF) Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda
DELEGATION PRINCIPLE FOR MULTI-AGENCY GAMES UNDER EX POST EQUILIBRIUM Yu Chen (Communicated by the invited editor Filomena Garci